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ABSTRACT
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was the product
of aggressive “secondary sanctions”—innovative sanctions that put economic
pressure on the target state by punishing states and entities that engage in
transactions with the target state. Prior to the JCPOA, the United States used
secondary sanctions to “outcast” Iran—isolate it from the international
community. After Iran entered into the JCPOA, these sanctions were removed
as a reward for its cooperation. In May 2018, however, the United States
withdrew from the JCPOA and re-imposed the secondary sanctions in order
to “re-outcast” Iran. But unlike the pre-JCPOA outcasting regime, the reoutcasting regime was not imposed in response to any violation of
international law by Iran; instead, it was imposed for solely policy reasons.
As a result, members of the international community condemned the use of
secondary sanctions as politically motivated and illegitimate.
Although the use of secondary sanctions is a relatively new
phenomenon, it has become increasingly more prevalent since the Iran
sanctions regime, serving as one of the main sources of pressure against
nations such as Cuba, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela. In contrast to the
growing prominence of secondary sanctions, however, the academic literature
on the topic remains thin. This piece seeks to fill that gap. By comparing the
pre-JCPOA outcasting regime with the re-outcasting regime, this piece
provides a timely insight into the counter-productive consequences of
imposing secondary sanctions for purely policy reasons. This piece highlights
that without international law, secondary sanctions are viewed as illegitimate,
which leads to defiance by states and creates a “chilling effect” that makes
cooperation less attractive for the outcast. Thus, this piece proposes that the
United States should only impose secondary sanctions in response to a state’s
violation of international law in order to avoid undermining the power of these
sanctions in the long run.
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INTRODUCTION

On August 5, 2015, President Barack Obama, in a speech at
American University, declared: “[w]e built a coalition and held it together
through sanctions and negotiations, and now we have . . . a solution that
prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, without resorting to war.”1
President Obama made this speech less than one month after the
implementation of the historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA).2 The “Iran Deal,” as it is more commonly known, was reached
between the Islamic Republic of Iran and China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and Germany (the P5+1).3 The Deal sought to
neutralize the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran and ensure Iran’s compliance
with its international-legal obligations.4
In his speech, President Obama highlighted the manner in which the
international community reached this monumental achievement.5 Instead of
resorting to violence, the international community imposed the most
comprehensive economic sanctions regime to date in order to induce Iran’s
cooperation.6 By denying Iran the benefits of cooperation, the international
community curbed Iran’s nuclear program and enforced international law
without resorting to violence—a process that Oona Hathaway and Scott
Shapiro coined as “outcasting.”7 The United States achieved this goal mainly
through “secondary sanctions”: sanctions that seek to pressure the target state
(Iran) by punishing other states or entities that engage in business with the
target state.8
Despite this initial success, however, on May 8, 2018, the United
States unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and re-imposed all previous

Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear
Deal
(Aug.
5,
2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal.
2
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, https://20092017.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA].
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Press Release, supra note 1.
6 Id.
7 Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and
International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 258 (2011).
8 GARY SAMORE, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFF., SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN: A GUIDE
TO
TARGETS,
TERMS,
AND
TIMETABLES
4
(2015),
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Iran%20Sanctions.pdf
(detailing that “[t]he Iran Sanctions Act was a “secondary” sanction, meaning companies
not based in the U.S. were also subject to sanctions by virtue of a threat: if companies chose
to do business with Iran’s energy sector, they could not also do business with the United
States.”).
1
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secondary sanctions.9 Given the unparalleled economic power of U.S.
secondary sanctions, their re-imposition virtually “re-outcasted” Iran. But
unlike the pre-JCPOA outcasting regime, the re-outcasting regime was not
imposed in response to violations of international law; rather, the reoutcasting regime came despite Iran’s full compliance with its international
legal obligations.10 As a result, the re-outcasting regime was uniformly
condemned by the international community as misguided and purely
political.11 This diplomatic context, in turn, led to two counterproductive
results: (1) it encouraged sovereign nations to defy U.S. secondary sanctions
in a way that might expose them as empty threats, and (2) it plagued the
international private sector with a “chilling effect.”12 These consequences not
only undermine the Iran re-outcasting regime, making it more difficult for the
United States to re-engage with Iran, but they will also diminish the power of
U.S. secondary sanctions in general, thereby undercutting their role as tools
of international engagement.
This piece proposes that in order to prevent further weakening of U.S.
secondary sanctions, these sanctions should only be used to outcast nations
that are in violation of their international legal obligations. That is because
international law legitimizes the use of these sanctions. In light of the rise of
U.S. secondary sanctions against foreign states other than Iran, such as Cuba,
North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela, this piece seeks to use the Iran sanctions
regime as a case study to provide timely insights and suggestions for future
uses of these sanctions.
This piece will proceed as follows: Section I will provide historical
context for the sanctions by outlining Iran’s nuclear developments; Section II
will provide an overview of the pre-JCPOA outcasting regime and highlight
the unique role of U.S. secondary sanctions in creating this regime; Section
III will explore the way in which sanctions impacted Iran’s economy, how the
United States promised a path to reintegration for Iran, and how Iran’s foreign
policy changed in response to the sanctions and the diplomatic effort; Section
IV will explore the lead-up to and details of the JCPOA as well as Iran’s initial
reintegration into the international community; and, finally, Section V will
outline the Iran re-outcasting regime, examine its counterproductive nature,
and explain the impact of the re-outcasting regime on the fate of the renewed
JCPOA negotiations and future outcasting regimes.

9

Mark Landler, Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned, N.Y. TIMES (May
8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nucleardeal.html.
10 See infra Part V.
11 See infra Part V.
12 See infra Part V.
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HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The international community’s concern about Iran’s nuclear program
did not emerge in a vacuum; it arose in response to the rise of an aggressive
and ideologically motivated Iran. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has
been at the center of numerous international conflicts.13 And while Iran’s
nuclear program has only been a cause for concern since the mid-2000s, Iran’s
nuclear capabilities have been decades in the making. This Section will
provide a brief overview of this historical context by summarizing the rise of
a nuclear Iran and highlighting Iran’s aggressive behavior.
In 1957, through its “Atoms for Peace” program, the United States
took the first step in creating one of the most dangerous nuclear programs in
the world.14 At the time, President Eisenhower wanted to help spread nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes and helped the Shah of Iran create the
Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC).15 In 1970, Iran ratified the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)16 as a Non-Nuclear
Weapon State (NNWS), and in doing so agreed not use its nuclear program to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.17 Pursuant to Article III
of the NPT, Iran signed a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which required Iran to be
transparent about its nuclear activities and related facilities.18 For years, Iran
developed its nuclear program peacefully and worked closely with the
international community. This cooperation, however, ended in 1979 following
the Islamic Revolution.
With the inception of the Islamic Republic, Iran’s nuclear program
became more advanced and secretive.19 In 2002, the Iranian opposition group
13

See, e.g., Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2020 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices: Islamic Republic of Iran, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 30, 2021),
https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/iran/
(outlining human rights abuses); The Iranian Hostage Crisis, U.S. DEP’T OF ST. OFF. OF
THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/iraniancrises (last
visited Jan. 24, 2022) (summarizing the Iran hostage crisis, during which the United States
embassy in Iran was seized and over 50 Americans were taken as hostages).
14 Ariana Rowberry, Sixty Years of “Atoms for Peace” and Iran’s Nuclear Program,
BROOKINGS (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/12/18/sixtyyears-of-atoms-for-peace-and-irans-nuclear-program.
15 Id.
16 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968,
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970) [hereinafter NPT].
17
Id. at art. II.
18 Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, I.A.E.A.-Iran, June 19, 1973, 954 U.N.T.S. 91 (entered
into force May 15, 1974).
19 See MICHELE GAIETTA, THE TRAJECTORY OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 53–72 (2015)
(discussing Iran’s nuclear developments during this time).
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Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MeK) revealed the existence of two covert nuclear
facilities in Iran—Natanz and Arak.20 This information revealed that Iran was
secretly paving the way for two separate paths to a potential nuclear weapon—
enriched uranium and plutonium.21 Natanz was being built to enrich uranium
to weapons-grade,22 while Arak was producing the heavy water that would be
used in a nuclear reactor to produce plutonium for a nuclear weapon. 23
Although Iran denied the allegations that it was aiming to weaponize its
nuclear program, these revelations sent shock waves throughout the
international community.
In order to avoid a U.N. Security Council Resolution against its
nuclear program, Iran began negotiations with the EU-3 (France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom) regarding its uranium-enrichment program and its
centrifuges.24 These negotiations never bore fruit, however, as Iran was
determined to continue some of its nuclear activities, and the EU-3 was not
willing to compromise.25 In June 2006, the U.N. Security Council adopted
Resolution 1696, its first Resolution regarding Iran’s nuclear program, which,
among other things, demanded that Iran halt uranium enrichment.26 Despite
this Resolution, Iran continued to advance its nuclear program under its new
conservative President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.27
In 2009, another opportunity for negotiations arose: as Iran continued
its uranium enrichment, it contacted the IAEA to obtain nuclear fuel for
civilian medical isotopes.28 The Obama administration saw this as an
opportunity to trade fuel for Iran’s enriched uranium, but was concerned that
the swap would legitimize Iran’s uranium enrichment.29 As these negotiations
began, Iran publicly acknowledged the existence of its Fordow nuclear
facility.30 This facility, built seventy-to-ninety meters inside a mountain,31
was clearly built to avoid detection, and Iran only acknowledged it after the

20

JAY SOLOMON, THE IRAN WARS: SPY GAMES,
THAT SHAPED THE M IDDLE E AST 114 (2016).
21

BANK BATTLES, AND THE SECRET DEALS

Id. at 118.

22 Id.
23

Id.
DANIEL JOYNER, IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM
CONFRONTATION TO ACCORD 31 (2016).
25 See id. at 32–33.
26 S.C. Res. 1696, ¶ 2 (July 31, 2006).
27 See DAVID PATRIKARAKOS, NUCLEAR IRAN: THE BIRTH OF AN ATOMIC STATE 231 (2012).
28 JOYNER, supra note 24, at 44.
29
TARITA PARSI, A SINGLE ROLL OF A DICE: OBAMA’S DIPLOMACY WITH IRAN 116–17
(2012).
30
Iran Nuclear Overview, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (Jun. 25, 2020),
https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/iran-nuclear/.
31 GEOFFREY KEMP & JOHN ALLEN GAY, W AR WITH IRAN: POLITICAL , MILITARY, AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 43–44 (2013).
24
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United States, France, and the United Kingdom had detected its existence.32
Ultimately, the negotiations broke down,33 and on February 9, 2010, Iran
declared that it would begin producing highly-enriched uranium.34 At that
point, Iran’s program began racing towards weapons-grade capability. By
January 2012, it was estimated that Iran had shrunk its breakout time to twelve
months,35 which meant that it had obtained the capability to produce enough
weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon by the beginning of 2013.36
As Iran was expanding its nuclear program, it was carrying out
another covert effort to develop its human capital. Beginning with a top secret
project called the Physics Research Center (PRC),37 Iran used various
institutions, including Iran’s prestigious Sharif University, as a front to obtain
nuclear physics knowledge from the West.38 By the mid-1990s, the PRC had
600 members and 12 different divisions.39 In developing its nuclear scientific
community, Iran ensured that Iranian scientists were capable of receiving the
necessary training domestically.40 Currently, it is estimated that thousands of
scientists, researchers, and technicians work on Iran’s nuclear program. 41
By the summer of 2015, Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and its
advanced scientific community gave Iran the ability to divert its nuclear
capabilities for military purposes within weeks.42

32

Iran Nuclear Overview, supra note 30.

33 The negotiations broke down for various reasons including the fact that the parties simply

could not agree on the terms of the trade. JOYNER, supra note 24, at 46.
34 Id.
35 TRITA PARSI, LOSING AN ENEMY: OBAMA, IRAN, AND THE TRIUMPH OF DIPLOMACY 180
(2017) [hereinafter Parsi 2].
36 See Olli Heinonen, Iran’s Nuclear Breakout Time: A Fact Sheet, WASH. INST. NEAR E.
POL’Y (Mar. 28, 2015), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iransnuclear-breakout-time-a-fact-sheet (defining “breakout time”).
37 SOLOMON, supra note 20, at 120.
38 Id. at 120–23.
39 Id. at 123.
40 See FARHAD REZAEI, IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: A STUDY IN PROLIFERATION AND
ROLLBACK 47–48 (2017); SOLOMON, supra note 20, at 123–24.
41 Juliet Lapidos, How Many Iranian Nuclear Physicists Are There?, SLATE (Jan. 12, 2010),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/01/could-the-assassination-of-a-physicist-stopiran-s-nuclear-weapons-program.html.
42 Heinonen, supra note 36 (explaining that “[i]f Iran brought online its other nearly 9,000
IR-1s, breakout time would be about three months with natural uranium feedstock and four
to six weeks with 3.5 percent UF6 feedstock. Iran has also developed the more advanced
IR-2m centrifuge, rated at 5 SWU/year. If the 1,000 IR-2ms installed at Natanz were used
in conjunction with all 18,000 IR-1s, the respective breakout times would be cut by a
third.”); Richard Nephew, Based on Breakout Timelines, the World Is Better Off with the
Iran Nuclear Deal than Without it, BROOKINGS (July 17, 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/0-7/17/based-on-breakout-timelines-theworld-is-better-off-with-the-iran-nuclear-deal-than-without-it.
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THE PRE-JCPOA OUTCASTING REGIME

The threat of Iran’s nuclear program presented the international
community with a difficult dilemma: respond with force or outcast. The
international community chose the latter. This Section will review the
development of the pre-JCPOA outcasting regime in response to Iran’s
growing nuclear program and violations of its international legal obligations.
Over the course of a decade, what began as a unilateral effort by the
United States turned into a cohesive, focused, and powerful international
sanctions regime. This Section will provide a detailed overview of the
sanctions regime through three phases: (1) unilateral sanctions by the United
States; (2) a more concerted effort by the international community through
U.N. Security Council Resolutions; and (3) an all-out economic attack, led by
U.S. secondary sanctions, on Iran’s financial sector and oil revenue.
A. Phase One: Unilateral U.S. Sanctions
Phase one began in the mid-1990s when the United States, concerned
about Iran’s growing nuclear program, unilaterally imposed sanctions on Iran.
Although the international community was not yet aware of Iran’s nuclear
program, the Clinton administration had grown suspicious and wanted to
combat any development through sanctions.43 In March 1995, President
Clinton issued an executive order, banning all U.S. investments in Iran’s
energy sector,44 followed by another executive order, which imposed a full
trade embargo on Iran.45
Frustrated with the international community’s failure to impose
sanctions on Iran,46 the United States passed the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) in
1996.47 ISA was the first attempt by the United States to impose secondary
sanctions on Iran.48 This particular tool allows a state to leverage its economic
power to isolate the target state financially from its trading partners.49 Using
this sanctioning tool, ILA allowed the United States to impose sanctions on
any foreign bank that was investing more than $20 million per year in Iran’s
energy sector.50
43

Zachary Laub, International Sanctions on Iran, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 15,
2015), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/international-sanctions-iran.
44 Exec. Order No. 12,957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (Mar. 15, 1995).
45 Exec. Order No. 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (May 6, 1995).
46 BRYAN R. EARLY, BUSTED SANCTIONS: EXPLAINING WHY ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL 91
(2015).
47 Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1996), amended by 22 U.S.C. §§ 8501–
8551 (2010).
48 SAMORE, supra note 8, at 3–5 (outlining the history of early U.S. sanctions on Iran).
49 Id. at 4.
50 Id. Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(1)(i).
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Despite its potentially lethal implications, ISA failed to deter foreign
investment in Iran because the United States failed to couple ISA with a
successful diplomatic effort. To some in the international community, it
seemed as if the United States was replacing a diplomatic effort with this
aggressive sanctions regime.51 The European Union went so far as to threaten
to challenge the sanctions at the World Trade Organization (WTO) as
“extraterritorial.”52 Ultimately, the United States was unwilling to face the
implications of sanctioning foreign firms, and instead provided waivers to
such firms as long as their respective governments agreed to restrict Iranian
imports.53
These efforts by the United States, however, were not accompanied
by any major sanctions by either foreign governments or the United Nations.
In fact, many of Iran’s major trading partners, such as countries in the
European Union, further expanded their economic ties with Iran in the 1990s
and early-2000s.54
B. Phase Two: U.N. Sanctions
By the mid-2000s, the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program became
more publicized. In November 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had
repeatedly failed to comply with many of its CSA obligations by failing to
report activities such as importation of natural uranium and failing to provide
design information for some of its facilities.55 In light of these failures, in
September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors decisively found Iran to be in
violation of its CSA obligations.56 As Iran’s nuclear program began to expand
and Iran continued to violate its CSA obligations, the international community

51 SAMORE, supra note 8, at 4; Meghan L. O’Sullivan,

Iran and the Great Sanctions Debate,
33 WASH. Q. 7, 7 (2010) (stating that some “lamented the poor record of these tools, calling
them ‘chicken soup diplomacy’ or ‘feel good’ foreign policy . . . [and] that imposing
sanctions did little more than satisfy the U.S. desire to take action”).
52 SAMORE, supra note 8, at 4.
53 EARLY, supra note 46, at 91–92.
54 Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions, INT’L. CRISIS GROUP 12
(2013),
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/138-spider-web-the-making-andunmaking-of-iran-sanctions.pdf [hereinafter Crisis Group Report].
55 YAEL RONEN, THE IRAN NUCLEAR ISSUE 16 (2010) (citing Int’l Atomic Energy Agency,
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶ 48,
IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/75 (Nov. 10, 2003)).
56
Id. (citing Int’l Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶ 1, IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/77 (Sept. 24, 2005)).
For a more detailed analysis of Iran’s failure to comply with its CSA obligations, see
JOYNER, supra note 24, at 95–188; see also NAMIRA NEGM, TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR
TECHNOLOGY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASE STUDY OF IRAQ, IRAN AND ISRAEL 195–
225 (2009).
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joined the United States in its effort to outcast Iran. On July 31, 2006, the U.N.
Security Council passed its first Resolution in response to Iran’s growing
nuclear program—Resolution 1696.57 Through this historic move, the United
Nations commenced phase two of the pre-JCPOA sanctions regime.
The major features of this phase were the four U.N. Security Council
Resolutions that imposed various sanctions on Iran: Resolution 1696,58
Resolution 1737,59 Resolution 1747,60 and Resolution 1803.61 All of these
Resolutions, however, stopped short of imposing sanctions on Iranian banks
or major Iranian entities because of the economic significance of Iranian
businesses.62 So, the sanctions remained narrowly targeted at Iran’s nuclear
program.63 For instance, Resolution 1696 called upon Members to “prevent
the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology” that could aid
Iran’s illicit activities,64 while Resolution 1737 demanded that Members
freeze the funds of identified individuals and entities involved in Iran’s illicit
nuclear activities.65 And while U.N. Members complied with these sanctions,
they did very little to impose their own unilateral sanctions on Iran.66
C. Phase Three: The Turning Point
By 2010, it had become clear that phases one and two were largely
ineffective. Although the introduction of international law was vital in uniting
the international community in the pre-JCPOA sanctions regime, the
sanctions were simply not powerful enough to incentivize Iran to decelerate
its nuclear program.67 To truly curtail Iran’s nuclear program, it was necessary
to impose what former Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence David Cohen referred to as “truly biting sanctions.”68 In order to
achieve that goal, the United States decided to, once again, utilize secondary
57

S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 26.
Id. ¶ 2.
59 S.C. Res. 1737 (Dec. 23, 2006).
60 S.C. Res. 1747 (Mar. 24, 2007).
61 S.C. Res. 1803 (Mar. 3, 2008).
62 SOLOMON, supra note 20, at 147.
63 For a detailed discussion of these U.N. Security Council Resolutions, see ENRICO
CARSICH ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF UN SANCTIONS: FROM A TOOL OF WARFARE TO A TOOL
OF PEACE, SECURITY AND HUMAN R IGHTS 423–28 (2017).
64 S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 26, ¶ 5.
65 S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 59, ¶ 12.
66
SOLOMON, supra note 20, at 147–48.
67 See supra note 19–36 and accompanying text.
68 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the New York University School of Law on
“The Law and Policy of Iran Sanctions” (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/pages/tg1706.aspx [hereinafter Cohen Remarks].
58
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sanctions. But, unlike before, during phase three, the United States grounded
its use of secondary sanctions in international law.
By the time the United States had decided to bring back secondary
sanctions, Iran’s enrichment program was in violation of several U.N.
Security Council Resolutions. Specifically, Iran’s enrichment program and its
work on its heavy-water reactor violated U.N. Security Council Resolutions
1696 and 1737.69 Resolution 1696, which was adopted after the Security
Council determined that Iran’s nuclear program was a “threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression,”70 called on Iran to suspend its
enrichment-related activities and its work on its heavy-water reactor.71 The
Security Council subsequently adopted Resolution 1737, which once again
called on Iran to suspend those nuclear activities.72 As a Member of the United
Nations, Iran was obligated “to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council.”73 Iran was thus in clear violation of international law.74
In 2010, the Security Council took its efforts one step further by
adopting Resolution 1929.75 While this Resolution imposed many new
sanctions on Iran, its most significant consequence was that it guided the
United States and the rest of the world to impose far more aggressive
unilateral sanctions on Iran.76 For instance, Resolution 1929 expressed a
“need to exercise vigilance over transactions involving Iranian banks,
including the Central Bank of Iran, so as to prevent such transactions
contributing to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development
of nuclear weapon delivery systems.”77 It also “[c]all[ed] upon all States . . .
to prevent the provision of financial services . . . of any financial or other
assets or resources if they have information that provides reasonable grounds
to believe that such services, assets or resources could contribute to Iran’s

69

S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 26, ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 59, ¶ 2.
PAUL K. KERR, CONG. RES. SERV., RS40094, IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: TEHRAN’S
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 18 (2021) (quoting U.N. Charter art. 39).
71 S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 25, ¶¶ 1–2.
72 S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 59, ¶ 2.
73 KERR, supra note 70, at 18 (quoting U.N. Charter art. 25).
74 For its part, Iran countered that the Resolutions were void because they ran contrary to
Iran’s right under Article IV of the NPT to “develop . . . nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes.” JOYNER, supra note 24, at 205 (quoting NPT, supra note 16, art. IV). This
argument was unpersuasive because, as the P5+1 pointed out, pursuant to Article 103 of
the U.N. Charter, “[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligation under the present Charter shall prevail.” Michael
J. Glennon, Iran’s Right to Enrich, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 2, 2013),
https://www.justsecurity.org/3937/irans-enrichment (quoting U.N. Charter art. 103).
75 S.C. Res. 1929 (June 9, 2010).
76 Cohen Remarks, supra note 68.
77 S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 75, at 3.
70
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proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities . . . .”78 Encouraged by Resolution
1929, the United States, through the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
in the Department of Treasury, implemented secondary sanctions on two main
fronts. First, it isolated Iran’s financial sector through the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act (CISADA). 79 Second, it
targeted Iran’s oil revenue, mainly through secondary sanctions on the Central
Bank of Iran (CBI) through Section 1245 of the National Defense
Authorization Acts for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA FY 2012). 80
i.

Sanctions Targeting Iran’s Financial Sector

First, the United States financially isolated Iran through the use of
CISADA. Through this legislation, the Department of Treasury acted
aggressively to target Iran’s financial institutions including Iran’s largest
banks such as Mellat and Tejarat.81 Additionally, the Department of Treasury
went further to target Iran’s unofficial financial sector, which was heavily
influenced by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).82 The IRGC—
although technically part of Iran’s military—is one of Iran’s largest economic
forces and influences over 200 major Iranian companies in the automotive,
petroleum, aviation, shipping, and construction sectors.83 It is estimated that
the IRGC and the Office of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei directly
control at least half of Iran’s economy.84 The combined effect of the sanctions
imposed on Iran’s official and unofficial financial sectors was devastating for
Iran.85
After the enactment of CISADA, it became clear to the international
financial community that the choice between doing business with the United
States or doing business with Iran was no choice at all. Foreign banks, such
as HSBC and Deutsche Bank, feared the repercussions of being cut off from
78

Id. ¶ 21.
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 8501–
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80 Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1245, 125 Stat. 1298, 1647–50 (2011).
81 Josh Rogin, U.S. Sanctions Another Big Iranian Bank, FOREIGN POL’ Y (Jan. 23, 2012),
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83 EMANUELE OTTOLENGHI ET AL., F OUND. FOR THE DEF. OF DEMOCRACIES, HOW THE
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DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Jan. 13, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/news/pressreleases/sm1234.
85 Crisis Group Report, supra note 54, at 24–30.
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the U.S. financial sector and the risk of further investment in Iran was too
high; so, they quickly began to disinvest from Iranian entities that were
blacklisted by Treasury.86 Major transnational firms, including Ernst &
Young, Daimler AG, Caterpillar, ENI, and Total, halted all significant
transactions with Iran.87 Indeed, the risk was so grave that it dissuaded
investment by firms located in countries that were most hostile to U.S.
sanctions. For instance, Chinese oil companies, namely China National
Petroleum Company (CNPC) and Sinopec, halted multiple upcoming projects
in Iran’s energy sector—some of which would have been worth billions of
dollars.88 Moreover, the secondary sanctions on the IRGC and its affiliates
meant that foreign financial institutions had to abandon IRGC’s powerful
affiliates altogether.89
These secondary sanctions were also unprecedented in their ability
to discourage some of Iran’s biggest financial supporters: banks in the Persian
Gulf. In the years leading up to the secondary sanctions, the banks in the
Persian Gulf, especially those in the United Arab Emirates, had been
instrumental in boosting Iran’s vital import-export sector.90 Yet, even those
banks abandoned Iran in response to the secondary sanctions. 91 According to
Stuart Levey, the former Under Secretary of Treasury for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence, following the threat of secondary sanctions by the
United States, there was a “new seriousness” among Middle Eastern banking
institutions in their efforts to financially isolate Iran.92
The penalties associated with the secondary sanctions were so severe
that they created a “chilling effect”; they scared entities away from doing even
unsanctioned business with Iran.93 This chilling effect was further amplified
by America’s robust enforcement practice.94 For example, in 2012, as a way
See Robert J. Einhorn, Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, Dep’t of
State, Keynote Address at the Arms Control Association Briefing Series: Solving the Iran
Nuclear
Puzzle
(Mar.
9,
2011)
(transcript
available
at
https://www.armscontrol.org/events/RoleSanctionsIranNuclear).
87 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Sanctions Related to Iran (July 31,
2012),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/07/31/fact-sheetsanctions-related-iran.
88 See Shannon Tiezzi, China’s Already Preparing for a Post-Sanctions Iran, DIPLOMAT
(Apr. 8, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinas-already-preparing-for-a-postsanctions-iran.
89 Crisis Group Report, supra note 54, at 9.
90 Chip Cummins & Joy Solomon, U.A.E. Cuts Off Ties to Iran Banks, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
6,
2010),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703298504575534041013995702.
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93 Joy Gordon, The Human Costs of the Iran Sanctions, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 18, 2013),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/18/the-human-costs-of-the-iran-sanctions.
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to warn the intentional community about its commitment to enforce these
sanctions, the United States sanctioned two major international banks—
China’s Kunlun Bank and Iraq’s Elaf Islamic Bank—for engaging in financial
transactions with designated Iranian banks.95 In the official statement
announcing the imposition of sanctions against these banks, Secretary Cohen
warned: “[a]ny bank, anywhere, that seeks to provide a financial lifeline to
Iran’s designated financial institutions should know that it will be held
accountable and its activity will be exposed.”96 Less than a month later, the
United States accused Standard Charter of engaging in financial transactions
with designated Iranian banks.97 The mere accusation sent more shock waves
across the international financial sector.98 One senior official in Dubai
expressed: “all international banks are scared stiff at the moment of having
any links to Iranian entities . . . .”99 By engaging in such aggressive
enforcement, the United States was sending a clear message: unlike the
secondary sanctions that were merely threatened in the mid-1990s, the new
wave of secondary sanctions would be enforced.
This attack on Iran’s financial sector was strengthened by the
successive rounds of E.U. sanctions. In 2010, the European Union—
encouraged by the U.N. Security Council Resolutions—barred all European
investments in Iran’s energy sector.100 In doing so, it withdrew the muchneeded investment in Iran’s energy sector. The European Union also
terminated virtually all financial ties between the Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) and Iran.101 Prior to this
move, SWIFT conducted a large portion of Iran’s international financial
transactions. For instance, in 2010 alone, nineteen Iranian banks and twentyfive Iranian banking affiliates had made close to two million transactions
using SWIFT.102 With the SWIFT route closed, Iran was rendered a financial
island with almost no ties to the international financial sector.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Kunlun Bank in China and
Elaf Bank in Iraq for Business with Designated Iranian Banks (Aug. 16, 2010),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1661.aspx
(announcing
sanctions on China’s Kunlun Bank due to its transfer of over $100 million to Tejarat Bank,
and sanctions on Iraq’s Elaf Islamic Bank due to its business transactions with sanctioned
Iranian banks).
96 Id.
97 Camilla Hall, Dubai Jittery Over Business with Iran, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2012),
https://www.ft.com/content/63c880bc-e23f-11e1-8e9d-00144feab49a.
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100 Council Decision 2010/413, 2010 O.J. (L 195) 39 (EU).
101 Council Decision 2012/635, 2012 O.J. (L 282) 58 (EU).
102 Payments System SWIFT to Cut Off Iranian Banks, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2012),
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As a final blow to Iran’s financial and banking sector, the European
Union also banned the majority of transactions between European and Iranian
banks.103 Although many European banks had by that time already been
dissuaded from conducting business with Iranian banks due to the draconian
U.S. secondary sanctions, this move by the European Union encouraged many
European banks to go above and beyond what the sanctions required in cutting
ties with Iran in order to guard against potential expansion of these sanctions
in the future.104
ii. Sanctions Targeting Iran’s Oil Revenue
While the attack on Iran’s financial sector was bearing fruit, the
United States was also attacking another critical part of Iran’s economy: its
oil revenue.105 In 2011, oil made up eighty percent of the Iranian government’s
exports, and approximately sixty percent of the government’s total revenue.106
Naturally, any aggressive sanctions regime had to include Iran’s oil sector.
The most effective tool in this fight was Section 1245 of the NDAA
FY 2012, which sanctioned any foreign bank that purchased oil or any other
goods from CBI, unless the home country of that foreign bank had
significantly reduced its oil purchases from Iran.107 CBI was a particularly
attractive target for secondary sanctions because pursuant to Iran’s domestic
regulations, all oil transactions must be cleared through CBI.108 So, the
imposition of Section 1245 essentially meant that any country that wanted to
continue buying oil from Iran had to significantly decrease its oil imports to
avoid U.S. sanctions.109 The main purpose of this provision was to force all of
Iran’s major oil trading partners to gradually turn elsewhere for their oil
purchases.110 This innovative technique was a significant move for the United
States. Because the United States had imposed an oil embargo on Iran
following the 1979 Revolution,111 it could not leverage its non-existent oil
trade with Iran to increase economic pressure. Moreover, many of Iran’s
major oil importers—Asian countries in particular—were not open to
103
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104 CORNELIUS ADEBAHR, E UROPE AND IRAN: THE NUCLEAR DEAL AND BEYOND 64 (Richard

Whitman & Richard Youngs eds., 2017).
105 Sanctions Reduced Iran’s Oil Exports and Revenues in 2012, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
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unilaterally sanctioning Iran’s energy sector.112 So, the United States was able
to use Section 1245 to dissuade reluctant countries that continued to purchase
oil from Iran to cut down those purchases.113 For instance, following the
passage of Section 1245, Japan, one of Iran’s largest oil importers,
significantly reduced its oil imports despite its fears of rising oil prices and its
dependence on Iran’s oil imports.114 As one Japanese economist put it: the
secondary sanctions provided the United States with a “very strong card.”115
Similar to Japan, other Asian countries that had been reluctant to cut their oil
imports from Iran (such as India and South Korea) did so to avoid U.S.
sanctions.116 The secondary sanctions even persuaded China, the most
reluctant Asian country, to decrease its oil imports from Iran.117 Although
China had expressed vocal opposition to these measures from their
inception,118 it ultimately complied.119 This compliance translated into a
significant loss for Iran because China had been Iran’s single largest oil
importer at the time.120
These secondary sanctions were quickly followed by a second round
of E.U. sanctions, which embargoed Iranian oil exports to the European
market and banned insurers from providing insurance policies for Iranian oil
transportation.121 Both of these sanctions were devastating for Iran’s energy
sector. The European oil embargo deprived Iran of its second largest regional
buyer.122 In the years prior to the Embargo, many European countries were
112
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exporting significant amounts of oil from Iran. Greece, for instance, relied on
Iran for approximately fourteen percent of its oil imports.123 Spain and Italy
were likewise dependent on Iran for approximately fifteen and thirteen
percent of their oil imports respectively.124 Europe’s dependence on Iran’s oil
was crucial for the Iranian economy as Europe’s oil purchases accounted for
a quarter of Iran’s total oil exports.125 Similarly, the sanction on insurance
companies was no trivial move by the European Union. Approximately ninety
percent of the oil tanks in the world were insured by the International Group
of Protection and Indemnity Clubs (IGP&I).126 Because IGP&I was subject to
European law, it became very difficult for most of the tanker fleets in the
world to insure the transportation of Iranian oil.127 This, in turn, had effects
far beyond the European market. In June 2012, South Korea announced that
due to the lack of insurance on Iranian oil tanks, it had no choice but to halt
its Iranian oil imports temporarily.128 Although some of Iran’s biggest buyers,
such as Japan and India, were able to resolve this problem by providing
government-backed insurance to tanks carrying Iranian oil, insurance
difficulties accounted for a significant drop in Asian exports of Iranian oil in
2012.129 In this way, the European insurance sanction came to the aid of the
U.S. secondary sanctions to cut Iran’s oil exports to Asia.
By 2012, the joint effort by the United States and the European Union
was successful in persuading every single one of Iran’s major oil purchasers
to substantially decrease their imports. In 2011, prior to the sanctions targeting
Iran’s oil sector, Iran was exporting 2.5 million barrels of oil per day. In 2012,
Iran’s oil exports plummeted to 1.5 million barrels per day,130 and then again
to 1.3 million barrels per day in 2013.131 This precipitous drop in oil exports
had a disastrous impact on Iran’s total revenue. While the Iranian government
was earning close to $100 billion in oil revenue in 2011, the earnings had been
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slashed to $35 billion by 2013.132 The dramatic drop in the Iranian
government’s revenue was exacerbated by financial sanctions that prevented
Iran from accessing the little revenue that it was earning.133 By 2013, more
than $100 billion worth of Iranian oil revenue was frozen in foreign banks. 134
In sum, as Iran continued to violate its international legal obligations,
the United States was able to more easily justify its use of secondary sanctions
and the rest of the world complied. In fact, Europe joined America’s efforts
by imposing its own unilateral sanctions on Iran.135 By 2013, the decades-long
effort to financially isolate Iran had finally become successful.
IV.

OUTCASTING ON THE GROUND: THE DOMESTIC IMPACT OF THE PREJCPOA SANCTIONS REGIME

An outcasting regime is only successful if the outcast state is
encouraged to cooperate in exchange for reintegration into the international
community. As this Section will explain, the pre-JCPOA sanctions regime
was successful because it was able to translate Iran’s economic isolation into
132
133
134
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a change in Iran’s foreign policy. To demonstrate this phenomenon, this
Section will begin by examining how the phase-three sanctions led to
economic hardship for everyday Iranians. It will then highlight how the
United States incentivized Iran to cooperate by pairing the economic pressure
with encouraging rhetoric that communicated to Iran that a path to
reintegration was possible. Finally, this Section will end by examining how
the joint effort—economic pressure and the promise of reintegration—led to
a change in Iran’s foreign policy.
A. Economic Impact of the U.S. Secondary Sanctions Regime
Despite the sanctions in phases one and two, Iran’s overall economy
continued to thrive.136 Indeed, in 2012, Iran’s GDP peaked at $598.87
billion.137 As the secondary sanctions entered the picture, however, Iran’s
economy began its downturn. By 2013, Iran’s financial isolation and
dwindling oil revenue crippled its economy, leading to an unprecedented drop
in the value of Iran’s currency (the rial), a significant blow to Iran’s major
industries, an increase in the unemployment rate, and shortages of food and
medicine.138
One of the most significant economic consequences of the secondary
sanctions was the sudden loss in value of the rial. Although the value of the
rial had been dropping against the value of the dollar steadily over the
preceding decade,139 this trend was escalated in 2012, when the effects of
secondary banking and financial sanctions were coupled with the significant
drop in Iran’s oil revenue. Consider that in September 2011, the rial traded at
13,000 to the dollar, but by October 2012, the value of the rial had plummeted
to 37,000 rial to the dollar.140 Secretary Cohen referred to this massive
depreciation of the Iranian currency as “perhaps the most dramatic reflection
of the . . . financial sanctions.”141 This trend, combined with Iran’s financial
isolation, created a one-two punch that hit almost every sector of the Iranian
economy. For instance, the sudden destabilization of the rial threw Iran’s
business sector into a panic.142 Businesses were hesitant to buy or sell goods
See SHAYERAH ILIAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34525, IRAN’S ECONOMIC CONDITIONS:
U.S. POLICY ISSUES 4 (2010).
137 Iran GDP, TRADING ECON., https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/gdp (last visited Feb. 2,
2022).
138 See infra note 139–172 and accompanying text.
139 Rick Gladstone, A New Sign of Distress as Iran’s Currency Falls, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1,
2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/world/middleeast/irans-rial-plummetsagainst-the-dollar.html.
140 CORDESMAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 5.
141 Cohen Remarks, supra note 68. Notably, severe mismanagement and corruption in Iran
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142 Crisis Group Report, supra note 54, at 25–26.
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because the exchange rates were changing rapidly.143 The consequences of
these financial and trade sanctions were further amplified through the chilling
effect, as foreign businesses feared conducting any transaction with Iran. 144
Unsurprisingly, this financial pressure had severe consequences on the output
of many companies. In 2013, it was reported that Iran’s automotive industry,
Iran’s largest manufacturing sector,145 was forced to cut its output by
approximately forty-three percent.146
Sanctions also hurt Iran’s most significant site of foreign investment:
fossil fuel extraction. Iran is home to the world’s fourth largest oil reserves
and the second largest natural gas reserves.147 That said, developing these
reserves requires massive investments.148 In 2011, Iran’s Oil Minister stated
that Iran needed $300 billion to address the declining rate of production in its
oil fields.149 Despite the attractive investment opportunities, foreign investors
did not want to risk being sanctioned by the United States or the European
Union and declined to invest.150 The impact of these withdrawals was
significant—estimates put Iran’s losses of investments in the energy sector
close to $50 billion.151
The challenges faced by Iran’s business sector trickled down to
impact the lives of everyday Iranians, particularly the working class, as the
financial constraints faced by Iranian businesses led to delayed payments,
unemployment, and bankruptcies.152 In 2012, it was estimated that
bankruptcies had tripled in Iran, and forty percent of the working men in Iran’s
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major cities had lost their jobs.153 But the impact of the sanctions was not
limited to the working class; it was also felt by Iran’s elites. For instance,
Iranians who could previously afford to send their children abroad for
education were struggling to pay tuition as the rial plummeted. 154
These multifaceted sanctions also led to an increase in the price of
goods and shortages of food. With the depreciation of the rial and inflation
reaching approximately twenty-nine percent, the price of food items
(especially meat and dairy) escalated dramatically.155 The cost of food was
further amplified as financial and banking sanctions began making the
financing of such transactions difficult.156 This was true despite the fact that
the sanctions allowed for exemptions for food.157 Given the draconian
financial consequences of violating the secondary sanctions, many
international banks preferred to steer clear of dealing with Iran all together,
even if it meant halting legal transactions.158
From May to June 2012, the Institute for Sustainable Development
reported that there was a fifty-two percent increase in the price of meat and an
eighty-one percent increase in the price of dairy.159 Prices of everyday food
items such as rice, beans, and sugar also increased.160 Unlike the economic
impacts on Iran’s industrial sector, which mainly impacted the working class,
the increase in the price of food hurt the middle class as well. 161 These price
hikes had such significant impacts on the lives of everyday Iranians that many
had no choice but to change their lifestyles—with many cutting meat from
their diets entirely. In response to this phenomenon, one restaurant owner
commented, “it was as though people had turned vegetarian overnight.”162
Similarly, Iran’s health sector, despite also being exempt from
sanctions,163 suffered a major blow. Inflation led to massive increases in the
price of medical treatment, and the fear of transacting with Iran led to
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shortages of medicine.164 The chilling effect was particularly damaging to this
sector. Nasar Naghdi, the director general of Darou Pakhsh, which supplied
almost a third of Iran’s pharmaceutical needs, told reporters at the time that it
was as if the medical firms had imposed their own sanctions on Iran.165 The
fatal problem was that the potential consequence of being sanctioned was so
dramatic that many big pharmaceutical companies and banks abandoned Iran
altogether.166 It was reported that by 2013 only one international bank in
Turkey was willing to conduct transactions with the Iranian medical sector.167
Unsurprisingly, the effect on the price and availability of medications was
catastrophic—especially for medications that were traditionally imported. For
instance, certain cancer medications became so rare that the lives of many
cancer patients in Iran were in danger.168 Iranians with other medical problems
such as diabetes also suffered gravely.169
In sum, by early 2013, the pre-JCPOA sanctions regime had truly
isolated Iran from the international community, and the people of Iran fully
recognized that. In 2013, a survey conducted by Gallup concluded that Iran
had the second highest “negative experience index score,”170 essentially
labeling Iran as the second “unhappiest” country in the world. 171
B. Tempting a Path to Reintegration
While the aggressive sanctions in phase three had completely
financially isolated Iran, pure isolation was not enough to form a successful
outcasting regime. In addition to sheer economic pain, the outcasting regime
also needed to induce Iran’s cooperation by enticing a path to reintegration.
After all, an isolated state (even in the face of extreme economic hardship)
has little incentive to cooperate if there is no path out of isolation.
The pre-JCPOA sanctions regime was successful in credibly
promising this path for Iran through encouraging and consistent rhetoric,
which made it clear that Iran would be better off as a result of cooperation.
164
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For instance, at the height of the sanctions, Secretary Cohen described the
United States’ strategy as “dual-track”—one that coupled sanctions with a
path for cooperation.172 Specifically, Secretary Cohen conveyed America’s
commitment to the latter prong of this dual strategy by emphasizing that the
United States offers “diplomatic engagement to Iran—providing Iran with a
path to reclaim its place among the community of nations.”173 Moreover, in
November 2013, President Obama—as if speaking directly to the Iranian
people—declared that “[i]f Iran seizes this opportunity [for cooperation], the
Iranian people will benefit from rejoining the international community.” 174
So, while the sanctions were crippling Iran’s economy, the United States was
working to ensure that Iran and its people knew that there was a path for
reintegration; and, as it turned out, this effort was successful in reaching the
Iranian people. By 2015, the vast majority of Iranians believed that an
agreement between Iran and the international community would alleviate the
intensity and impact of the sanctions. In fact, in the lead-up to the Iran Deal,
over eighty-five percent of Iranians believed that the United States would lift
some of the sanctions if an agreement was reached.175
Thus, through its rhetoric, the United States was able to tempt a path
to reintegration for Iran even though it was actively leading an aggressive
economic sanctions regime. It was against the backdrop of this dual-track
strategy that a drastic change in Iran’s domestic politics started to take form.
C. Outcasting Alters Iran’s Foreign Policy
The true success of the pre-JCPOA sanctions regime laid in its ability
to transform economic pressure into a change in Iran’s foreign policy. Iranian
leaders had for years maintained that sanctions had no effect on Iran’s
economy and would not impact its foreign policy.176 But, as the phase-three
sanctions began to take effect, it became clear that both claims were false. As
the Iranian economy began to deteriorate, Iran’s domestic politics began to
172

Cohen Remarks, supra note 68.
Id.
174 Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on First Step Agreement
on Iran’s Nuclear Program (Nov. 23, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2013/11/23/statement-president-first-step-agreement-irans-nuclear-program.
175 NANCY GALLAGHER ET AL., CTR. FOR INT’L & Sec. STUD. AT MD., THE IRANIAN PUBLIC
OPINION ON THE NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS: A PUBLIC OPINION STUDY 16 (2015),
https://cissm.umd.edu/sites/default/files/2019-07/UTCPOR-CISSMPA%20final%20report%20062215.pdf.
176 For example, on September 10, 2012, Iran’s Oil Minister, Rostam Qasemi, claimed that
the sanctions had helped Iran become more self-reliant. CORDESMAN ET AL., supra note
116, at 7. Exactly one month later, Ayatollah Khamenei stated that the “[s]anctions are not
an issue of yesterday or today. Sanctions have existed from the very beginning; they have
intensified the sanctions . . . [but] these won’t work . . . .” Id. at 8.
173

2022]

THE RISE AND FALL OF U.S. SECONDARY SANCTIONS

413

change. The economic pressure led to infighting among the political elites, a
recognition by Ayatollah Khamenei that a change in foreign policy was
necessary, and finally, the rise of the Rouhani administration.
First, as the economic pressure generated by phase three was felt
across Iran, there was a rise in intense infighting among the political elites. 177
International isolation and its effects on Iran’s economy emboldened the
opposition to the Ahmadinejad government.178 In September 2011, Akbar
Rafsanjani, a former president and a founding member of the Islamic regime,
publicly warned Iran’s Assembly of Experts to “not downplay the sanctions .
. . .”179 In September 2012, members of the Iranian parliament openly accused
Ahmadinejad of sabotaging the Iranian currency for political gains.180 Over
one hundred members of the parliament signed a letter demanding that
Ahmadinejad be brought in for questioning.181 As the infighting continued
and the economic pressure mounted, influential political leaders recognized
that it was time to rethink Iran’s foreign policy and begin engaging with the
international community. In the words of analyst Trita Parsi, “[t]he question
was no longer whether there should be a relationship [with the great powers],
but rather [what] the nature of that relationship [should be].”182
Beginning in 2012, while Ahmadinejad and the Ayatollah continued
to deny that the sanctions were hindering Iran’s economy, 183 behind the
scenes, the regime was attempting to open a path through bilateral talks with
the United States. While there are conflicting accounts as to whether
Ahmadinejad was willing to seriously consider curbing Iran’s nuclear
program,184 there is little dispute that the Ayatollah, the far more significant
political figure in Iran, was.
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By March 2012, Ayatollah Khamenei had privately given his
blessing for the Iranian delegation to begin bilateral negotiations with the
Americans, and in July 2012, the first Iranian delegation traveled to Oman to
meet secretly with the Americans.185 This was a significant move by Iran.
Although the Ayatollah warned his advisors that they should be “vigilant
because [they cannot] trust the Americans,” his move to circumvent the
extreme hardliners in order to engage in bilateral talks with the United States
showed a drastic change in the Ayatollah’s foreign-policy approach.186 And
while no meaningful progress was made during the first bilateral meeting, it
had become clear that Iran had the blessing of the most powerful man in Iran
to begin a serious conversation regarding the downscaling of its nuclear
program.187
As the political elites began recognizing that the pressure induced by
the sanctions needed to be alleviated through direct negotiations with the
international community, the Iranian people were becoming more and more
outraged by the state of the economy. In late 2012, Iran witnessed one of its
largest uprisings since the 2009 Green Movement.188 In the first week of
October 2012, the value of the rial dropped by almost forty percent,189
prompting hundreds of citizens—including Tehran’s merchants (Bazaaris),
members of one of Iran’s most powerful groups—to flood the streets in
protest.190 And while the demonstrations were suppressed, they foreshadowed
what was to become one of the defining issues for the Iranian public in the
lead-up to the 2013 presidential election: the economy.
With the economy deteriorating due to sanctions, it was only natural
that the future of Iran’s nuclear program was going to take a life of its own
during the 2013 presidential election. The public recognized that in order to
alleviate their economic hardships, they needed a government that was serious
about negotiating with the international community. In February 2013, a
Gallup poll showed that fifty-six percent of the Iranian public believed that
185
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the sanctions were hurting the lives of Iranians “a great deal.” 191 It was at this
time that Hassan Rouhani, the Iranian moderate and former nuclear
negotiator, emerged as a strong presidential contender.192
Rouhani recognized that the people of Iran were in desperate need of
economic relief and that Iran had to alter its foreign policy to respond to the
economic pain. From the start of his campaign, Rouhani not only publicly
acknowledged the devastating impact of the sanctions, but he continued to
stress the importance of alleviating the economic hardship.193 While Rouhani
did not directly promise a nuclear deal, his willingness to enter into a deal
with the international community was apparent from his campaign
promises.194 Throughout the presidential campaign, Rouhani and his
supporters continued to emphasize the need for “normalization” of Iran’s
relationship with the rest of the world.195 This coded language was used to
highlight Rouhani’s commitment to rolling back Iran’s nuclear program,
earning him and his supporters the nickname “Normalizers.”196
By contrast, Saeed Jalili—the most prominent conservative
candidate and the one championed as Khamenei’s choice 197—refused to
acknowledge the impact of the sanctions on Iranians. Jalili went so far as to
claim that the sanctions were beneficial for Iran because they allowed the
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industrial sectors to thrive.198 The conservative political faction’s problems
cut deeper than Jalili’s denial of the economic realities; the conservatives
failed to articulate a unified position on nuclear negotiations. For instance, the
former Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, accused fellow conservative
Jalili of not doing enough to help relieve the pressure of the sanctions.199
Criticizing Jalili’s unreasonably hard stance toward negotiations, Velayati
said: “When the other side is ready to take three steps and you want to take
one step[,] it is obvious that you do not want to make progress.”200 Further
amplifying the divide among conservatives, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf,
another conservative presidential candidate, took a more moderate position by
maintaining that “foreign policy does not change much with the change of
[the] president.”201 This disjointed group of conservative candidates
essentially split the conservative vote,202 while the moderates united behind
Rouhani, handing him an overwhelming victory.203
The people of Iran made it clear that they wanted a leader that could
bring about real economic relief through a dramatic change in Iran’s foreign
policy.204 After his win, Rouhani assured the public that he would “pursue a
policy of reconciliation and peace.”205 As his new Foreign Minister, Rouhani
selected Javad Zarif, a U.S.-educated Iranian diplomat viewed by the west as
198
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a pragmatic moderate who had been sidelined after the 2009 election. 206
Selecting Zarif as the Foreign Minister was a signal that Iran was serious about
negotiations.207 Notably, this was one of the many choices that the Rouhani
administration made to open a new chapter in Iran’s foreign policy. 208
In this way, the economic pressure of the pre-JCPOA sanctions
regime was able to materially influence the domestic priorities of Iran,
creating not only a dialogue among the political elites regarding a change in
Iran’s foreign policy, but also bringing a new brand of Iranian politicians and
diplomats out of the shadows. With this achievement, it was time for the
United States to reap the fruits of outcasting by negotiating an agreement that
could bring Iran in compliance with international law and neutralize the threat
of a nuclear-armed Iran.
IV.

COOPERATION IN EXCHANGE FOR REINTEGRATION

By July 2012, Iran was willing to work with the international
community to dramatically curb its nuclear program. This was an opportunity
that the international community did not take for granted. In 2015, the P5+1
entered into the JCPOA with a newly cooperative Iran. In exchange for Iran’s
cooperation, the international community began the process of reintegration.
This Section will provide a brief overview of the lead-up to the JCPOA, the
substance of the Deal, and Iran’s initial reintegration into the international
community.
A. The Lead-Up to the JCPOA
In the lead-up to the summer of 2012, the United States was
following a two-track effort: economic pressure and diplomacy.209 By July
2012, the sanctions were beginning to truly cripple Iran’s economy, while
simultaneously, Iran’s nuclear program was reaching a dangerous peak.210 In
light of these two important developments, the United States decided that it
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was time to emphasize the latter prong of its dual-track effort. It did so by
initiating secret negotiations with Iran outside the official P5+1 channel. 211
While the first meeting between the two sides was largely fruitless,
the pace of the negotiations picked up with the U.S. concession to allow
enrichment on Iranian soil,212 and Rouhani’s selection as Iran’s new president
in 2013.213 After the U.S.-Iran negotiations made significant progress, the
P5+1 were brought into the fold. Eventually, all the parties signed the “Joint
Plan of Action” (JPOA) or the “Interim Deal” on November 24, 2013.214 This
agreement was vital as Iran was racing toward nuclear-weapon capabilities
and the Interim Deal substantially slowed its progress.215 After virtually
freezing the advancement of Iran’s nuclear program with the Interim Deal, the
P5+1 spent the following year and a half working toward a more
comprehensive agreement.
B. The JCPOA
On July 14, 2015, after months of intense negotiations, the P5+1 and
Iran signed the JCPOA. This agreement not only eliminated the threat of a
nuclear-armed Iran, but it also brought Iran into compliance with its
international legal obligations.216 The JCPOA, while complicated, essentially
addressed five major tasks: closing off the uranium-enrichment path, closing
off the plutonium-enrichment path, gaining access to Iran’s nuclear program,
ensuring Iran’s compliance with international law, and rolling back the
sanctions.
First, the JCPOA closed off Iran’s path to weaponized enriched
uranium—its most likely path to a nuclear weapon—by putting severe
restrictions on Iran’s uranium-enrichment program. The JCPOA restricted
Iran’s enrichment level to 3.67% for fifteen years,217 making it impossible for
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Iran to build a nuclear weapon with enriched uranium.218 The JCPOA also
required Iran to eliminate ninety-seven percent of its enriched uranium,
bringing it down from the original 10,000 kg to merely 300 kg—far below the
amount needed for a single nuclear weapon.219 Lastly, the Deal cut Iran’s
centrifuges from 19,900 to approximately 6,000 (only 5,000 of which could
be used for enrichment).220
Second, the Deal closed off Iran’s second path to a nuclear weapon
(plutonium) by essentially disabling the Arak heavy-water research reactor.221
By requiring an aggressive redesign of the Arak facility, the Deal ensured that
Iran could not produce enough plutonium for a nuclear weapon. 222
With the routes to a nuclear weapon closed, the biggest remaining
concern was that Iran could not be trusted to adhere to the JCPOA. In fact,
distrust was the premise of the Deal.223 For this reason, the JCPOA imposed
an extremely invasive and comprehensive monitoring regime to ensure Iran’s
compliance with its terms. Under the JCPOA, not only is Iran required to
comply with its CSA obligations and Additional Protocols,224 but it is also
subject to JCPOA’s unique monitoring protocols.225 The JCPOA protocols
include daily access to Iran’s declared nuclear facilities and further access to
any facility (including a military facility) that is suspected of engaging in
illegal activities.226 The combination of these monitoring protocols is so
extensive that experts have gone so far as to say that it is virtually impossible
for Iran to try to cheat without getting caught.227 And if Iran does try to cheat,
its breakout time is still over one year228—giving the international community
enough time to prevent a nuclear attack. By contrast, prior to the Deal, Iran’s
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estimated breakout time stood at merely two months,229 which might not have
been enough for an effective military intervention.230 In this light, the Deal
was a monumental achievement in neutralizing the threat of a nuclear-armed
Iran.
Fourth, the JCPOA also brought Iran into compliance with
international law. By enforcing the monitoring requirements, the JCPOA
ensured that Iran remains transparent about its nuclear program and continues
to comply with its obligations under the CSA. Moreover, the JCPOA set the
stage for the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231,231 which
nullified previous limitations on Iran’s uranium-enrichment program that had
been put forth by Resolutions 1696 and 1737.232 This was significant because
under the Deal, Iran maintained the ability to continue its uranium-enrichment
program.233 In this way, the JCPOA ensured Iran’s full compliance with its
international legal obligations. And, the JCPOA set the stage for the removal
of the pre-JCPOA sanctions regime.
C. Reintegration
In return for Iran’s compliance with international law, the JCPOA
began to pave a way back into the international community for Iran. In early
2016, the JCPOA members attempted to follow through on the promise of
reintegration by lifting the vast majority of the sanctions, including the U.S.
secondary sanctions.234
After the sanctions were lifted, Iran’s reintegration began almost
immediately. In 2016, Iran’s oil exports increased to 3.1 million barrels per
day from 2.8 million barrels per day in 2015.235 Mostly due to this increase in
oil exports, Iran’s overall economy grew by 12.5% in 2016.236 And, some of
the major investors that had fled Iran during the pre-JCPOA sanctions regime
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planned to return to Iran as the sanctions were lifted.237 But this growth was
also met with major obstacles, one of which was a chilling effect that spread
among foreign investors who feared that new sanctions might be around the
corner.238 As a consequence, the Iranian economy continued to struggle—the
rial remained relatively weak, the price of food remained high, and
unemployment stood at twelve percent.239 In reality, the economic
reintegration was much slower than expected, and one year after the sanctions
were lifted, Iranians were feeling disappointed by the slow pace of the
economic recovery.240 Despite the economic struggles that continued after the
JCPOA, the removal of the sanctions undoubtedly helped put the Iranian
economy on the road to recovery.241 In this way, outcasting through U.S.
secondary sanctions had proved itself to be successful: Iran was continuing to
abide by its international legal obligations in exchange for reintegration into
the international community. This all changed, however, in May 2018, when
the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA and re-imposed the U.S.
secondary sanctions regime.242
V.

THE IRAN RE-OUTCASTING REGIME

Despite the success of the JCPOA, the role of the United States in
pioneering and committing to the agreement has always been polarizing back
home.243 The opposition to the agreement gained momentum when Donald
Trump was elected president in November 2016, and eventually peaked in
May 2018 when President Trump followed through with his promise to
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withdraw the United States from the JCPOA. 244 Following this withdrawal,
the United States re-imposed the U.S. secondary sanctions regime and, in
effect, began “re-outcasting” Iran despite the fact that, at the time, Iran was
adhering to its nuclear-related international legal obligations.245 And while the
economic threat of being sanctioned by the United States once again forced
Iran’s trading partners to boycott Iran,246 major world powers publicly
condemned the re-outcasting regime as politically motivated and harmful.247
Iran, in turn, began breaching some of its obligations under the Deal, thereby
jeopardizing the Deal’s survival.248
The re-imposition of the U.S. secondary sanctions has created a
counter-productive re-outcasting regime. While the United States did not
violate international law by withdrawing from the JCPOA and re-imposing
sanctions,249 the fact that the re-outcasting regime was not imposed in
response to international law violations by Iran makes the regime counterproductive in two ways. First, it weakens the economic power of U.S.
secondary sanctions by encouraging resistance from sovereign states; and
second, it weakens the diplomatic power of U.S. secondary sanctions by
creating a long-lasting chilling effect that could undermine the path to
244
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reintegration. This Section will lay out the Iran re-outcasting regime and
examine how this new regime functions as a form of counter-productive reoutcasting by weakening both the economic and the diplomatic force of U.S.
secondary sanctions.
A. U.S. Withdrawal from the JCPOA and the Re-Imposition of U.S.
Secondary Sanctions
On May 8, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States
will withdraw from the JCPOA and re-impose the U.S. secondary sanctions
regime.250 To many who had followed the journey of the JCPOA, this
withdrawal did not come as a surprise. The Republicans had generally
opposed the Deal even prior to its inception.251 In fact, the opposition was so
strong that prominent members of the Republican party had made it clear that
America’s commitment to the JCPOA would be indefinitely vulnerable. In a
now-infamous letter, forty-seven Republican Senators, led by Senator Tom
Cotton, warned Ayatollah Khamenei and the rest of Iran’s political leaders
that “[t]he next president could revoke such an executive agreement with the
stroke of a pen and future Congresses could modify the terms of the agreement
at any time.”252 While at that time, this letter was seen mainly as an effort to
sabotage the on-going negotiations with Iran,253 its warnings proved to be
meritorious when President Trump unilaterally withdrew the United States
from the JCPOA in May 2018.254
Although the symbolic message and diplomatic impact of the
withdrawal were significant, the most important consequence of the
withdrawal was the re-imposition of the U.S. secondary sanctions. As
illustrated earlier, U.S. secondary sanctions were by far the most powerful
aspect of the pre-JCPOA outcasting regime.255 As such, it was expected that
the re-imposition of the U.S. secondary sanctions would begin a “reoutcasting” regime.
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This re-outcasting regime, much like the pre-JCPOA outcasting
regime, was undertaken primarily by OFAC and was split into two waves. 256
The first wave went into effect on August 6, 2018, following a 90-day winddown period, and the second wave went into effect on November 4, 2018,
following a 180-day wind-down period.257 In practice, these two waves
virtually re-imposed all nuclear-related U.S. secondary sanctions from the
pre-JCPOA sanctions regime.258
By the time the re-outcasting regime was complete, it was virtually
undisputed that Iran’s economy had taken a toll. Not only did the sanctions
halt the economic growth that was underway in Iran, but they also reversed
much of the economic recovery that had followed the JCPOA. 259 As was the
case during the pre-JCPOA sanctions regime, the re-imposition dramatically
slashed Iran’s oil exports, caused massive inflation, and increased
unemployment rates.260
The sanctions also had a devastating impact on foreign investment in
Iran. As the wind-down deadlines approached, international financial
institutions that had taken the risk and revived commercial relations with Iran
after the JCPOA slowly started to withdraw from Iran, and within months,
major business deals and contracts were being nullified. In August 2018, for
instance, the French oil company Total withdrew from a multi-billion dollar
contract to invest in Iran’s South Pars gas field (the largest known natural gas
reserve in the world).261 This announcement came despite efforts from the
French and European authorities to obtain a waiver from the United States. 262
Other major European firms such as Maersk and Peugeot (automotive firm
with a strong presence in Iran) faced the same fate.263 In addition to European
companies, Chinese firms (despite China’s historical resistance toward U.S.
secondary sanctions on Iran) also abandoned Iran. For example, CNPC, which
had agreed to take over Total’s investment in Iran’s South Pars gas field, also
suspended its investment in the project to avoid U.S. sanctions. 264
International financial institutions also steered clear of engaging in
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transactions with Iranian banks.265 Although many major banks had been
cautious when dealing with Iranian banks even before the re-outcasting
regime, the re-imposition of U.S. secondary sanctions further pushed these
financial institutions away from Iran.266
While economically, the re-outcasting regime unfolded in virtually
the same manner as it had during the pre-JCPOA outcasting regime, the
diplomatic posture of the re-outcasting regime was different. When the United
States announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran had been complying
with all of its nuclear-related international legal obligations.267 For its part, the
Trump administration did not dispute this fact when it withdrew from the
Deal; instead, the administration put forth mainly policy justifications for the
withdrawal and the re-imposition of sanctions. Specifically, the Trump
administration justified the withdrawal by claiming that the JCPOA “gave the
Iranian regime too much in exchange for too little” and “enriched the Iranian
regime.”268 It went on to claim that the withdrawal “will pressure the Iranian
regime to alter its course of malign activities.”269 In light of these purely policy
justifications, the international community condemned the withdrawal as
purely political while maintaining that Iran no longer posed a nuclear threat.
At the center of this condemnation was the emphasis on Iran’s continued
compliance with its international legal obligations.270 Unlike the pre-JCPOA
sanctions regime, the re-outcasting regime was imposed despite Iran’s
compliance with international law. And the JCPOA members underscored this
point as they expressed opposition to the U.S. withdrawal. In their joint
statement, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom specifically noted that
“[a]ccording to the IAEA, Iran continues to abide by the restrictions set out
by the JCPOA, in line with its obligations under the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”271 Likewise, Russia and China
emphasized Iran’s “full compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA”
265
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in a joint statement that they released prior to and in anticipation of the U.S.
withdrawal.272
The JCPOA members also rejected the U.S. claim that the JCPOA
was a threat to world security. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom
emphasized that the “agreement remains important for [their] shared
security,” and that the decision by the United States has caused “regret and
concern.”273 China and Russia also emphasized that “the JCPOA proved to be
a significant contribution in strengthening global nuclear non-proliferation
architecture as well as international security as a whole.”274 World leaders also
went further to unilaterally condemn the withdrawal as politically motivated.
President Macron told reporters that the decision by President Trump was “for
his own domestic reasons,” and “a campaign pledge [President Trump] made
long ago.”275 Moscow referred to the actions taken by the United States as
“American aspirations to settle political scores with Iran.”276 China’s Foreign
Minister, Wang Yi, responded by stating that China openly “oppose[s] the
wrong practices of unilateral sanctions and ‘long-arm jurisdiction’ in
international relations.”277 For its part, Iran responded to the U.S. withdrawal
by violating some of its obligations under the Deal.278 And while some
JCPOA members pushed back against these breaches (the European members
went so far as to trigger the Deal’s mechanism for dispute resolution), they
continued to express their commitment to the Deal.279
So, while the economic reaction to the re-outcasting regime was
similar to the one witnessed during the pre-JCPOA sanctions regime, the
diplomatic response was more resistant. Without an international law
272
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violation to point to, the United States failed to justify the re-outcasting regime
as either a valid diplomatic decision or necessary for world security. In sum,
unlike the use of U.S. secondary sanctions in the pre-JCPOA outcasting
regime—which was seen as an effort by the United States to coalesce the
international community in response to Iran’s violations of international
law—the re-imposition of the secondary sanctions during the re-outcasting
regime was seen as an effort by the United States to strong-arm the
international community in order to settle a political score. As the next Section
will explain, re-outcasting a nation in the face of adherence to its international
legal obligations is counter-productive.
B. The Iran Re-Outcasting Regime as Counter-Productive
At its core, an outcasting/re-outcasting scheme is a “carrot-and-stick”
regime. The sanctions work as the stick and the eventual economic
reintegration serves as the carrot. For the U.S. secondary sanctions regime to
function as an effective outcasting tool, both components of the carrot-andstick regime need to be powerful. The counter-productive re-outcasting
regime has weakened both components.
First, the re-outcasting regime may undermine the economic power
of U.S. secondary sanctions by encouraging sovereign nations to defy U.S.
sanctions; and second, by creating a long-lasting chilling effect around
financial transactions with Iran, the re-outcasting regime may obscure the path
to reintegration—thereby weakening the diplomatic power of U.S. secondary
sanctions. In this way, the renewed sanctions regime has weakened both the
carrot and the stick.
i.

U.S. Secondary Sanctions as Empty Threats

There is virtually no dispute that U.S. secondary sanctions can inflict
a lot of economic hardship on an outcast state. The immense power of a U.S.
secondary sanctions regime lies in its ability to unilaterally isolate a nation.
Sustaining a unilaterally led secondary sanctions regime, however, might be
difficult in the face of international resistance. Given the fact that the U.S.
economy relies on globalization, enforcing secondary sanctions could
backfire by damaging the U.S. economy. While in the near future the threat
of secondary sanctions may lead to compliance from sovereign states, in the
long run, these same sovereigns might be willing to defy these sanctions if
they see them as illegitimate. If this defiance from sovereign states
materializes, some of the most powerful U.S. secondary sanctions may be
exposed as empty threats due to America’s inability to enforce them.
As noted earlier, despite the economic compliance by the
international community, the Iran re-outcasting regime faced diplomatic
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opposition from its inception.280 As the re-outcasting regime continued,
however, the international community began to show economic defiance as
well. One of the most prominent expressions of defiance came from the E3,
which officially launched the “Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges”
(INSTEX) based in Paris in January 2019.281 This “special-purpose vehicle”
was created after the United States imposed the re-outcasting regime in order
to facilitate European trade with Iran despite the U.S. sanctions.282 This
vehicle was created to serve as a catalyst between Iran and European
companies283—substituting in for private international financial institutions
that had previously facilitated trade between Iran and Europe. INSTEX is
uniquely structured because it’s supported and governed by multiple
sovereign nations rather than private individuals or entities. Initially, the
governments of the E3 served as its sole shareholders,284 and its board
comprised of government officials from these three countries.285 By
November 2019, however, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands,
Norway, and Sweden had also become INSTEX’s shareholders.286
While the success of the special-purpose vehicle is yet uncertain, it
carries with it a great deal of significance. INSTEX was the first major effort
by European powers to jointly circumvent U.S. secondary sanctions by
allowing international companies to conduct trade with Iran without going
through the international financial sector.287 As this piece outlined earlier, the
power of U.S. secondary sanctions is based on their threat to cut off
international financial institutions from the U.S. financial sector and, by
extension, the U.S. dollar.288 So, at their core, U.S. secondary sanctions
concentrate their leverage on banks and other financial institutions. But
INSTEX may be able to shield itself from the consequences of U.S. sanctions
because of its unique structure. Because INSTEX is directly backed by major
280
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European allies and its supervisory board is composed of government
officials, sanctioning INSTEX would, in effect, be sanctioning European
allies.289 Such a move would be a far more aggressive step than those taken
thus far. As such, it is far less likely that the United States would actually
sanction INSTEX. This could give INSTEX a major leverage in bypassing
U.S. sanctions because it could make sanctioning a costly endeavor for the
United States.
As of now, though, INSTEX’s significance is mostly symbolic. It’s
officially only authorized to trade commodities that are already exempt from
U.S. secondary sanctions (such as food and medicine).290 After months of
planning, INSTEX finally processed its first transaction with Iran in March
2020: exporting medical supplies from Europe to Iran.291 Although INSTEX’s
function is best described as modest in frequency and scope, its existence
nevertheless possesses a threat to the economic power of U.S. secondary
sanctions. Not only is it possible for this device to expand to non-exempt
trades, but it can also expand to include other countries (European and nonEuropean) in the future.292 Although facilitating trade of non-exempt goods
would increase INSTEX’s exposure to U.S. sanctions, INSTEX could further
shield itself from sanctions by including more countries into the scheme,
thereby increasing the cost of sanctions for the United States.
The mere existence of INSTEX foreshadows a potentially significant
setback created by counterproductive re-outcasting. As outlined earlier, the
United States has thus far only imposed major secondary sanctions on private
entities on a case-by-case basis.293 In that posture, the United States has had a
major advantage because it has been able to leverage its financial power
against private entities one at a time. But the move by the United States to reimpose sanctions in this manner motivated Europe to take this unprecedented
step toward counterbalancing the United States.294 At bottom, the lack of legal
legitimacy that accompanies counter-productive re-outcasting might
incentivize and justify two efforts that can actually undermine the economic
power of U.S. secondary sanctions: rebuke by sovereign states and unification
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of economic forces. INSTEX is the result of both—not only does it leverage
the combined economic weight of major European powers, but it also
leverages their combined diplomatic pull. This, in effect, makes it a much
more difficult target for the United States.
While INSTEX is unique in that it is a combined effort by sovereign
states, in practice, many sovereign states could also unilaterally weaken the
economic effect of U.S. secondary sanctions by simply refusing to comply
with U.S. demands. A prime example of a sovereign nation that could
unilaterally defy U.S. sanctions is China. At bottom, if China chooses to defy
U.S. sanctions, the United States would probably be unable to enforce some
of its most aggressive sanctions because doing so would greatly harm the U.S.
economy.295 This is especially true with regards to U.S. sanctions on Iran’s oil
sector. America’s most effective tool for targeting Iran’s oil sector, Section
1245 of the NDAA, is geared toward sovereigns rather than private entities.296
Recall that through Section 1245, the United States threatens to boycott all
financial institutions that are predominantly in a jurisdiction of a nation that
refuses to substantially decrease its oil imports from Iran.297 The economic
gravity of following through with this sanction cannot be overstated. Given
the powerful nature of Section 1245, the United States cannot enforce it
aggressively without also harming the U.S. economy. Thus, experts have long
expressed concern about these sanctions being exposed as empty threats. Jay
Solomon, for instance, noted that even in 2011, many U.S. officials feared that
if countries such as India and China refused to follow U.S. sanctions, the
United States could be exposed as the “emperor with no clothes.”298
But the United States avoided this outcome during the pre-JCPOA
sanctions regime. While the sheer economic power of the United States was
critical for this achievement, the diplomatic posture of the outcasting regime
also made it very difficult for Iran’s oil buyers to defect. The pre-JCPOA
sanctions regime came at a time when the world was fully aware of Iran’s
dangerous nuclear progress and its various international law violations.299 As
a result, in addition to pressure from the United States, major world powers
had independent reasons to outcast Iran during the pre-JCPOA outcasting
regime.300 So, by 2012, the world had recognized the threat of a nuclear Iran,
295
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and international law had authorized sanctions as a form of response to this
threat. Thus, when the United States began gearing up its most aggressive
secondary sanctions, those sanctions were seen as legitimate tools in response
to a real threat from Iran.
These same aggressive U.S. secondary sanctions were imposed in a
completely different context during the re-outcasting regime. These renewed
sanctions regime were not legitimated by international law, nor was it
imposed as an effort to combat a real threat from Iran. In this context,
sovereign states may be more likely to defect, thereby exposing the United
States as the emperor with no clothes.301 Currently, there are signs of defection
from sovereign states. Prior to the implementation of the re-outcasting regime,
the Trump administration emphasized its commitments to a “maximum
pressure” campaign against Iran.302 At the center of this campaign was an
effort to pressure every country to cut its oil imports from Iran entirely.303 For
instance, in September 2018, senior members of the Trump administration
demanded that importers of Iranian oil cut their oil imports down to zero by
November 2018.304 The administration also maintained that it would not grant
any waivers.305 Yet, as the deadline approached, pressure from countries
hoping to continue importing oil from Iran forced the administration to grant
waivers to eight countries that imported approximately seventy-five percent
of Iran’s total oil exports.306 Even after the waivers expired, countries such as
China and India continued to purchase oil from Iran.307 Although the vast
majority of Iran’s buyers eventually abandoned Iran in response to the reimposition of sanctions, the defiance from countries such as China and India
was powerful because it illustrated just how vulnerable the re-outcasting
regime is.
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Indeed, reports of a multibillion-dollar partnership between Iran and
China have begun circulating. According to the reports, China is planning
major long-term investments in Iran’s banking, telecommunications, and
railways sectors.308 By late-2021, support from China and Russia—in the
form of continued purchases of Iranian oil—was considered a major obstacle
to effectively outcasting Iran.309
At bottom, although the United States has been successful in
weakening Iran’s economy through the use of secondary sanctions, the recent
spark in resistance against the use of these sanctions could indicate the rise of
powerful defectors. If this defiance grows, it could expose U.S. secondary
sanctions as empty threats. Naturally, the impact of that exposure would go
beyond the Iran re-outcasting regime and create long-lasting implications for
the use of secondary sanctions in general. In short, by encouraging open
defiance, the re-outcasting regime could weaken the stick in the “carrot-andstick” sanctions scheme.
ii. Long-Lasting Chilling Effect
As explained earlier, to incentivize an outcast state to cooperate, the
international community needs to provide a path for reintegration.310 And
while reintegration after the lifting of sanctions can normally be assumed, the
Iran re-outcasting regime may have undermined that assumption. A counterproductive re-outcasting regime will, in all likelihood, intensify the chilling
effect that lingers after U.S. secondary sanctions have been lifted. This is
because re-imposing secondary sanctions, despite the outcast state’s
compliance with its international legal obligations, will confirm the fear that
drives the chilling effect in the first place: secondary sanctions can be reimposed at any time. And while sovereign states may stand united in defiance
of U.S. secondary sanctions, private entities may not. So even if the economic
power of U.S secondary sanctions is weakened because of defiance by
sovereign states, no meaningful reintegration can take place if the private
international financial sector is out of reach due to the chilling effect. In this
way, this chilling effect will obscure the path to reintegration, which could
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discourage Iran and other similarly situated outcasts from engaging (or in
Iran’s case, re-engaging) in cooperation altogether.
iii.

Chilling Effect Following the JCPOA

Even before the abrupt re-imposition of secondary sanctions in 2018,
there was a major chilling effect around dealings with Iran. As noted earlier,
when the secondary sanctions were initially imposed during the pre-JCPOA
outcasting regime, major international financial institutions were dissuaded
from engaging in even unsanctioned business with Iran—creating a chilling
effect around doing any business with Iran.311 And while this chilling effect
might have initially helped incentivize Iran to participate in negotiations by
adding to the economic pressure, it became problematic when the
phenomenon remained after the sanctions were officially lifted in 2016. 312
Despite improvements in the Iranian economy, many international
banks continued to avoid doing business with Iran partly because the sanctions
regime remained unpredictable.313 As one expert noted following the JCPOA:
“there is a growing reluctance [among] banks to get involved in any
transactions that could become subject to changing interpretations of existing
laws.”314 This uncertainty—caused partly by the complexity of the
reintegration regime—was further fueled by the divisive nature of U.S.
politics.315 Some foreign firms feared that U.S.-Iran relations might
dramatically change under a future president.316 While others, who saw Iran
as the unreliable party, feared that Iran would eventually violate the JCPOA,
causing the renewal of sanctions.317
In addition to the uncertainty surrounding the future of the JCPOA,
the outdated nature of Iran’s financial sector also dissuaded international
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financial cooperation.318 Years of sanctions had essentially left the Iranian
financial sector behind international developments.319 Following the removal
of sanctions, a senior banker in Tehran observed this consequence by noting
that “[the Iranian] banking system, like [the Iranian economy] has been
isolated and has no idea what has happened in the world over the past
decades.”320 In this way, the sanctions themselves made the Iranian financial
sector less attractive for investors even after their removal.
These concerns translated into practice as foreign investors exercised
extreme caution when dealing with Iran following the JCPOA. While some
believed that information and precaution would be enough to guard against
potential future risks, others were deterred by the cost of the precaution
itself.321 For instance, small and medium-sized entities in Germany feared that
the additional cost of precaution (such as the cost of expert advisors) would
outweigh the potential financial gain of conducting business with Iranian
entities.322 Even for international entities that were interested in conducting
business with Iran, it was difficult to find banks that were willing to enter into
transactions with Iranian banks because many banks feared the potential reimposition of sanctions and the massive fines that would accompany them. 323
This chilling effect was so powerful that even ongoing reassurances
from the source of the fear itself—the United States—achieved little success.
A few months after the removal of phase-three sanctions, then-Secretary of
State John Kerry spoke directly to multiple executives from major European
banks in an attempt to assure them that transactions with many of the major
Iranian banks and entities would no longer face punishment.324 Other U.S.
officials, such as officials from the Department of Treasury, encouraged
foreign investors to hire attorneys in order to better navigate business with
Iran.325 But these on-going reassurances and guidance did little to dampen the
uncertainty that had spread across international banks and other institutions.
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Re-Outcasting Amplified the Chilling Effect

The chilling effect that followed the JCPOA, although in itself
problematic, was expected to alleviate over time.326 Because uncertainty is
dampened by stability, the chilling effect would have gradually faded if Iran
had continued to comply with its obligations under the JCPOA and the United
States had maintained a consistent policy toward the agreement. The rather
abrupt and predominately political re-imposition of secondary sanctions,
however, will probably intensify that chilling effect to a potentially
destructive level. This is because by re-imposing secondary sanctions, the
United States validated the fear that had sparked the chilling effect in the first
place—uncertainty. The fact that the re-outcasting regime was perceived as
political will likely only fuel the chilling effect surrounding U.S. secondary
sanctions, and the reason for this is obvious: purely political decisions are by
nature unpredictable.
In addition to the political nature of the re-imposition, the unilateral
success of the re-outcasting regime in halting private business with Iran will
further amplify the chilling effect, because it confirms that those companies
that risked potential future sanctions by engaging in business dealings with
Iran paid the price while those that remained cautious did not. A comparison
between Airbus’s and Boeing’s paths illustrates this phenomenon. After the
JCPOA, Airbus entered into a contract with IranAir for one hundred passenger
aircrafts.327 Boeing had likewise entered into an agreement with IranAir for
eighty passenger aircrafts.328 Following the re-imposition of sanctions in
2018, both Airbus and Boeing were compelled to freeze all dealings with
Iran.329 Although both companies had multi-billion dollar contracts with
IranAir, Boeing was far more cautious in its dealings.330 Boeing never began
building the aircrafts nor did it factor their sales into its revenue calculation
326
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because it feared that the future of the JCPOA was uncertain. 331 Airbus, on
the other hand, not only officially booked its agreement with Iran, but it began
building and delivering some of the aircrafts.332 As such, Airbus made itself
more vulnerable to financial damage by being more aggressive with its
business dealings with Iran.333
The same pattern emerged in other sectors. The French carmaker
Renault, for instance, lost approximately six percent of its revenue after the
re-imposition of sanctions, which was partly due to losing a post-JCPOA
agreement that was expected to increase its vehicle production by seventyfive percent.334 But Total, a company that behaved more cautiously, was able
to avoid significant losses after the re-outcasting regime was imposed;
although Total lost a multi-billion dollar project in Iran’s gas fields, it had not
started the project by the time the sanctions were re-imposed, so it was able
to avoid a major financial blow.335
Given this turn of events, it would seem likely that many
international foreign institutions will be less inclined to enter into business
dealings with Iran even if the re-outcasting regime is reversed. Naturally, this
chilling effect would be greater than the one formed after the JCPOA since
the purely policy/political justifications for the re-outcasting regime make any
future agreement vulnerable to withdrawal. Thus, in an ironic twist, the
unrivaled economic power of U.S. secondary sanctions might diminish their
power as diplomatic tools—thereby weakening the carrot in the carrot-andstick regime.
This predicted chilling effect will inevitably weaken the reward for,
and by extension, the likelihood of cooperation. After all, why accede to
international demands if the incentive for doing so is diminished? Thus, the
chilling effect weakens the diplomatic power of U.S. secondary sanctions. As
emphasized throughout this piece, the success of an outcasting regime is not
measured solely by its ability to isolate a state; rather, a successful outcasting
regime must induce cooperation—an option that becomes less attractive as the
path to reintegration becomes less certain. As the former Secretary of Treasury
331
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Jack Lew expressed in early 2016: “[T]o pressure bad actors to change their
policy, we must be prepared to provide relief from sanctions when we
succeed. If we fail to follow through, we undermine our own credibility and
damage our ability to use sanctions to drive policy change.”336
Thus, a re-outcasting regime that is not responding to a state’s
violation of international law is counter-productive because it weakens both
the punishment and the reward for the outcast state. Because a counterproductive re-outcasting regime is imposed despite a state’s compliance with
its international legal obligations, it is seen as a purely political move that is
not responding a real threat. As such, such a regime will encourage sovereign
states to defy U.S. secondary sanctions, while discouraging private financial
institutions to resume dealing with the outcast state even after cooperation.
C. Moving Forward: The Future of the Iran Deal and Beyond
The economic power of the United States is unparalleled; but, as the
diplomatic and private-sector reactions to the re-imposition of the Iran
sanctions regime illustrate,337 brute economic force might not be enough to
sustain successful outcasting regimes indefinitely. Without the legitimization
that comes from international law, in the long-run, defiance by other nations
and the chilling effect will diminish the power of U.S. secondary sanctions as
tools of outcasting.
The current state of the Iran re-outcasting regime and the struggle
around the renewed efforts by the Biden administration to return to the Iran
Deal illustrates this phenomenon. Since taking office, the Biden
administration has made meaningful efforts to return to the Iran Deal and
bring Iran back into compliance with its JCPOA obligations. By September
2021, the United States, Iran, and representatives from other members of the
JCPOA had participated in half a dozen meetings, but, unfortunately, with
little progress to show for it.338 The lack of any immediate progress is, at least
in part, due to the diminished power of the U.S. secondary sanctions. For one,
increasing sovereign defiance of U.S.-economic sanctions has weakened the
“stick” in the Iran re-outcasting regime. Although Iran’s economy has
undoubtedly suffered as a result of the re-imposition of sanctions, sovereign
defiance has provided a lifeboat for Iran’s economy. This in turn, has made
Iran less desperate for economic relief. In the midst of the renewed nuclear
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negotiations, it was reported that economic assistance from Russia and China
made Iran more emboldened in the negotiations.339 According to reports, Iran
even considered expanding its demands of concessions from the United States
because it saw U.S. sanctions as yielding “diminishing returns.”340 At the
same time, Iran also pointed to the abrupt 2018 withdrawal by the United
States to emphasize that it was engaging in the negotiations with skepticism.
In his first U.N. speech, Iran’s new President Ebrahim Raisi said: “We don’t
trust the promises made by the U.S. government,”341 thereby signaling that
the economic relief—or “carrot” in the carrot-and-stick regime—had lost
some of its attractiveness for Iran. This, of course, does not mean that the
renewed talks are hopeless. Indeed, both Iran and the United States have
signaled that they remain hopeful that a new agreement is feasible.342 But the
prolonged struggle illustrates the way in which counter-productive outcasting
has diminished the effectiveness of the U.S. secondary sanctions as outcasting
tools.
Any diminished effectiveness will likely follow U.S. secondary
sanctions outside of the Iran sanctions regime. After all, if sovereign nations
create mechanisms for circumventing U.S. secondary sanctions—such as
INSTEX343—or, defy U.S. secondary sanctions without severe
consequences—as China and Russia have344—they could do so in the face of
any other U.S. secondary sanctions regime that they oppose. And if the United
States cannot be trusted to bring back economic prosperity to a nation by
lifting the sanctions for a sustained period, then, not just Iran, but any other
outcast would be less enticed to yield to U.S. demands.
As the current crisis in Ukraine demonstrates, powerful U.S.
secondary sanctions are more important than they have ever been in limiting
armed conflict. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not only a violation of
international law,345 but also one of the biggest threats to international stability
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in modern times. Not surprisingly, in response to this unprecedented threat to
international security, the United States has turned to secondary sanctions.346
Although Russia is no stranger to U.S. sanctions,347 these new sanctions are
far more aggressive than their predecessors, targeting, for instance, the
Russian financial sector through sanctions on SWIFT and the Central Bank of
Russia.348 The imposition of such sector-wide sanctions on a major economic
and global player like Russia is unprecedented. But, despite the material
impact of these sanctions on the global economy,349 the international
community is following the lead of the United States in outcasting Russia. 350
Even China, which has long voiced its opposition to U.S. secondary sanctions,
has been hesitant to outright violate the Russian sanctions regime.351 While it
is too soon to tell whether the regime will be effective in limiting armed
conflict, the lack of resistance toward aggressive U.S. secondary sanctions by
the international community further illustrates just how powerful U.S.
secondary sanctions can be in outcasting a state when they are legitimized as
tools of enforcing international law.
To help sustain the power of U.S. secondary sanctions, moving
forward, the United States should continue to strategically maintain and build
on the legitimacy of U.S. secondary sanctions by using them only to enforce
a nation’s international legal obligations as it did during the pre-JCPOA
sanctions regime and is currently doing in its imposition of the Russia
sanctions regime.
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CONCLUSION

When the United States opted to sanction Iran instead of resorting to
violence, it took a big risk. Not only was Iran an economically significant
nation, but it was also a hostile one—a nation that seemed to be racing toward
a nuclear weapon, unfazed by international condemnation.352 Sanctions on
Iran could have become futile if the international community was not properly
incentivized to boycott Iran or if Iran was unpersuaded by the weight of the
sanctions. Nevertheless, as this piece shows, the United States was able to
overcome these potential shortcomings through the use of U.S. secondary
sanctions during the pre-JCPOA sanctions regime.353 As a result of the preJCPOA sanctions regime, U.S. secondary sanctions emerged as
unprecedented tools in an effort to enforce international law. Because these
sanctions were able to unilaterally compel third parties to join the sanctions
regime, they proved to be uniquely powerful outcasting tools. But the preJCPOA U.S. secondary sanctions were propelled by more than mere brute
force: they were also legitimated by Iran’s increasingly threatening nuclear
program and continuous violations of international law.
The re-outcasting regime, however, was not legitimated by any
international law violation by Iran.354 And the international reaction to the reoutcasting regime illustrates the importance of international law as a
legitimizing force for the success of U.S. secondary sanctions.355 Although
the economic power of the United States is unparalleled, it is not absolute. As
a result, this economic force needs legitimacy. As this piece proposes,
international law can provide that legitimacy. Otherwise, these newly created
outcasting tools might be viewed as empty threats that can be ignored and/or
too unpredictable to trust.
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